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The Problem of Cinematic Imagination
  Rafe McGregor 
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: to identify the problem
of cinematic imagination, and then to propose a satisfactory
solution.  In part one I analyze the respective claims of
Dominic McIver Lopes and Roger Scruton, both of whom
question the scope of imagination in film, when compared to
other art forms, on the basis of its perceptual character.  In
order to address these concerns I develop a hybrid of Gregory
Currie’s model of cinematic imagination and Kendall Walton’s
theory of make-believe in section two.  Section three offers a
reply to Lopes and Scruton, examining the problem in terms of
the tension between the normativity of films as props and the
employment of the creative imagination by audiences.  I
conclude with a solution that admits of two incompatible
conceptions of cinematic imagination.
Key Words
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1.  The scope for imagination
Film is the most mimetic of contemporary art forms in the
sense that it seems almost to replicate rather than represent
reality.  It is this capacity for reproduction and simulation that
makes cinematic imagination problematic.  I shall use a
particularly realistic example, Steven Spielberg’s Saving
Private Ryan (1998), to demonstrate the puzzle.  My response
to the second scene in the film was something along the lines
of “This is exactly what it must have been like on Omaha
Beach on D Day.”  The use of surround-sound technology in
the cinema theater provided an effective complement to the
visual devices employed onscreen, the result of which was that
the experience of war was reproduced as accurately as
possible.  The simulation was so realistic that I felt I was using
my imagination at only the most basic level, so that it seemed
impoverished when compared with how I appreciate art forms
such as painting, literature, and music.  Currie produced the
first comprehensive philosophy of film in the analytic
tradition,[1] and I shall present a brief summary of his model
of cinematic imagination before proceeding to Lopes’ and
Scruton’s respective articulations of the problem. 
Currie noted that the word “imagination” is variable and
opaque, and specifies his concern as the engagement with
fiction.  He proposed the “simulation hypothesis” as an account
of the functioning of the imagination:  imagining involves
projecting oneself into the situation of another, and then
conceiving of one’s own beliefs and desires in that
situation.[2]  Therefore, imagination consists of pretend beliefs
and desires that are run “off-line, disconnected from their
normal perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs.”[3]  Currie
distinguished primary from secondary imaginings.[4]  Primary
imagining is simply imagining what is fictional, for example,
Captain Miller on Omaha Beach on D Day.  Secondary
imagining supplements primary imagining when it concerns the
experience of a fictional character, such as Miller, on Omaha
Beach on D Day, as disorientated and frightened.  That
secondary imaginings are essential to one’s engagement with
fiction is self-evident. 
Imagination in film is typically and distinctively impersonal and
perceptual.  It is impersonal because of Currie’s rejection of
the “imagined observer hypothesis” and the absence of
egocentric information. When I watch Saving Private Ryan, I
imagine Miller on Omaha Beach; I do not imagine myself
seeing Miller on Omaha Beach, which would imply that I have
some sort of presence in the film.[5]  The perceptual
imagination involved in film has features of structure and
content absent in literature.  Perceptual beliefs “bunch
together in so far as perception tends to give us beliefs about
color, size and shape as an indissoluble package with a high
degree of specificity.”[6]  I therefore imagine Miller as looking
exactly like Tom Hanks as he appears in Saving Private Ryan. 
Lopes asked “whether cinematic experience…takes advantage
of our imaginative capacities.”[7]  He challenged Currie’s
replacement of the traditional model of imagination as quasi-
experience, that is, visualization, with quasi-belief, and draws
attention to the difference between the experience of reading
a detailed description of a landscape, for example, and the
experience of seeing that landscape in a film.  When watching
King Kong (1933) he does not imagine – simulate perceptual
belief in – King Kong, but has a sensory experience of the
monster which prompts his simulated perceptual beliefs.[8] 
According to Lopes, therefore, the sensory experience of a
giant gorilla onscreen is prior to, and more fundamental than,
the simulated belief in King Kong; the imagination is
subordinate to perception.  Lopes holds that an account of
propositional imagining must be accompanied by an account of
sensory imagining:
...in pictorial imagining, the propositional imagination
harnesses an occurrent visual experience in order to
shape its content, borrow its phenomenology, and
sustain a rich variety of imagined visual actions.[9]
Lopes’ criticism of Currie is that he ignores the significance of
the sensory experience that is so crucial to the experience of
film; he believes this omission is proved by a flaw in Currie’s
model.  Lopes noted that experience is belief-independent for
Currie because a belief in Captain Miller is actually an off-line
imagined belief, that is, an imagining.  I imagine Miller rather
than believe in him, and so my experience occurs without
belief.  “And if my experience is independent of what I believe
then it is independent of what I imagine, since, on Currie’s
account, imagination is simulated belief.”[10]  According to
Lopes, Currie’s own theory relies on the primacy of the
sensory (cinematic) experience that he has failed to
acknowledge. 
Scruton’s “Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen” is a
somewhat rhetorical defence of theater over film, and although
his condemnation of fantasy appears to have a moral rather
than logical basis, Kathleen Stock agreed that there is indeed
a link between film and fantasy.[11] Scruton proposed a strict
dichotomy between imagination and fantasy.[12]   The
appreciation of art employs the imagination and aims to
understand reality by indirect means.  This return to reality
through representation is realism.[13]  The imagination grasps
the reality by way of style, convention, and manner in
description and depiction.  The route to reality (for example,
the bombing of Guernica on the 26th April 1937) is circuitous
(the complex representation in the cubist painting by Pablo
Picasso), and the reality can only be understood by the active
employment of the imagination. 
In contrast, fantasy is “a real desire which, through
prohibition, seeks an unreal, but realized, object.”[14]  Scruton
is concerned with desires that are typically the target of self-
imposed prohibitions, such as sex and violence.  An object of
fantasy is realized when it “leaves nothing to the imagination”
and is a surrogate for another object.[15]  In fantasy, the
desire is for the surrogate to mirror the reality as closely as
possible, like a waxwork or photograph, but this mimesis
focuses attention on the surrogate and thus away from the
reality.  By combining photography with movement and sound,
the medium of film is a near-perfect simulacrum. Whereas the
theater employs conventions and stylistic constraints to
represent reality, film constitutes an absolute and explicit
realization that is actually an escape from reality.[16]  In
watching a film, therefore, I am presented with a substitute for
reality, which Stock refers to as a “fantasy prop.”[17]     
Scruton believes that the medium of film contains an inherent
conflict between the reality principle of dramatic representation
and the realization principle of the camera.[18]  In the case of
prohibited desires, the camera’s capacity for complete
realization means that “There is therefore a danger that
fantasy will take over, so as to dominate the interest in
representation.”[19]  If his view is correct, then the second
scene of Saving Private Ryan is not a representation of Omaha
Beach on D Day but a realization, and so focuses on the
fantasy (the explicit violence in the film) rather than the reality
(the human drama of D Day).  Stock agrees that an increase
in realization produces a more potent fantasy prop because it
contributes to the fantasist’s goal of avoiding awareness that
the fantasy is not real.[20] It is worth noting that Scruton
recently reiterated the distinction between imagination and
fantasy, claiming that both he and Stock understated the
essential differences in the respective paradoxes by which they
operate.[21]
Contrary to Scruton, there is no doubt that I used my
imagination when I watched Saving Private Ryan.  I imagined
that Hanks was Miller, that Miller was disorientated and
frightened, and that there were (at least) three series of
events happening coincidently:  Miller fighting on Omaha
Beach, Private Ryan en route to Ramelle, and Mrs. Ryan
learning of her tragic loss in Iowa.  These imaginings, and
many others like them, were necessary to understand the film
as a narrative.  However, in a sense Scruton was correct in
that, despite my awareness of the fiction, I seemed to actually
see soldiers being shot, drowning, and blown apart, and
Spielberg’s graphic portrayal of D-Day appeared to have left
very little for me to imagine.  In fact, I appeared to have
employed significantly less of my imaginative capacity in
watching the fictional film than if I were to read a non-fictional
account or examine historical photographs.  Perhaps Lopes is
correct, and watching Saving Private Ryan is an experience
that is, or could be, independent of the imagination, or
perhaps the answer lies with Scruton, for whom the film would
be a paradigm of realization, the gratification of a violent
fantasy.  I shall return to these questions shortly. 
2.  Imagination as make-believe
Currie’s model of cinematic imagination is based on his earlier
work in “Visual Fictions” and forms part of his contribution to
the cognitive theory of imagination, which recognizes the
functional similarity of imagination and belief.  He identified
two distinct conceptions, visualisation and make-believe. 
Visualization is the “activity of image-making.”[22]  It can be
produced by both fiction and non-fiction, but is necessary for
neither.  Make-believe applies to fiction alone, and is best
understood as an attitude.  To make-believe is to take a
particular attitude towards the propositional content of fictions,
and the functional relations between the attitudes of believing
and make-believing a proposition are similar in some ways
and different in others.  For example, adopting an attitude of
make-believe to the proposition that Miller is dying of his
wounds disconnects me from my response in the case of
belief:  I may weep but I will not call for an ambulance.[23] 
Currie’s concern is with the role of the imagination in the
engagement with fiction, and he regards imagination as
identical with make-believe.  He noted the similarities and
differences between fantasies, such as daydreams, and
fictions.  While they both involve a narrative consisting of
characters and events, the latter are interpersonally accessible
where the former are not.[24]  Fantasies and fictions are both
“objects of make-believe,” and neither necessarily involves
visualization.[25]  Although Currie and Walton’s respective
conceptions of make-believe differ on a number of points,[26]
I believe the similarities are significant.  As the lion’s share of
Currie’s discussion of imagination is devoted to its impersonal
character, I shall develop his views on perceptual imagining by
referencing Walton, and then use this hybrid model to answer
the question of the extent to which the imagination is
employed in film. 
Walton proposed the interaction with representational works of
art as a continuation of the games of make-believe played by
children.  He conceived of the imagination as a type of make-
believe that is independent of truth conditions.[27]  This
neatly explains how I can imagine Miller on D Day without
contradiction.  I imagine certain things about Miller, such as
that he looks like Hanks, that are false because Miller is
fictional; but I also imagine other things that are true, such as
that the battle on Omaha Beach in 1944 occurred.  Like Currie,
Walton identified the imagination as variable and distinct from
visualization.  His theory relies on three core concepts:
 prompters, objects, and props. 
Walton defined a prompter as something that prompts the
imagination “by being perceived or otherwise experienced or
cognized.”[28]  A broomstick that prompts me to imagine a
rifle is a prompter, and conventions may be internalized so
that whenever I see a broomstick I automatically imagine a
rifle.  The broomstick also functions as an object of imagining,
because I imagine of real object X (the broomstick) that it is
imaginary object Y (a rifle).  Objects such as the broom
become prompters by chance; other objects, like toy trucks
and snowmen, are designed to produce the imaginings of real
trucks and living creatures, respectively.  Neither prompters
nor objects are necessary for imagining.  I could, for example,
decide to imagine what it was like on Omaha Beach on D Day
out of curiosity or a desire to pass the time, in which case
there would be no prompter and no object.  When I watch
Saving Private Ryan, the images onscreen serve as prompters
but not objects.  Walton believes that imagining with an object
is more vivid than without.[29] 
Props are “generators of fictional truths, things which, by
virtue of their nature or existence, make propositions
fictional.”[30]  The broomstick is a prop because it is
responsible for the fictionality of the proposition “I am holding
a rifle”; an image of Tom Hanks in Saving Private Ryan is a
prop because it is responsible for the fictionality of
propositions such as “John H. Miller is a captain in the US
Army.”[31]  Props function by “principle of generation,” which
involves a convention, prescription, or stipulation.[32] 
“Fictional propositions are propositions that are to be imagined
– whether or not they are in fact imagined.”[33]  Thus, there
is a normative aspect to the concept.  If I agree to the
prescription that broomsticks are rifles in a game of make-
believe, my failure to notice a broomstick lying on the floor will
not alter the fact that, in the game, a broomstick is a rifle. 
Similarly, my thoughts about Hanks, like reflections on his
acting ability or the extent to which he has aged since his
previous film, do not alter the fact that in Saving Private Ryan
Hanks is Miller.  Walton defined games of make-believe as
“exercises of the imagination involving props,”[34] and
restricts representation to the kinds of things that are typically
created to function as props.  Representational works of art
are “made specifically for the purpose of being used as props
in games of certain kinds, indefinitely many of them played by
different appreciators on different occasions.”[35] 
Currie didn’t discuss props explicitly, but he touched on the
issue when he considered the difference between fantasy and
fiction.  I cannot be mistaken about the content of a daydream
unless I fail to remember it accurately, but I can
misunderstand the content of Saving Private Ryan because this
content is determined by the work.[36]  The film is clearly a
prop about which “there are certain things it is appropriate to
make-believe, and certain things not.”[37]  I see the images
onscreen, and those images authorize me to imagine the
events represented by the film, that is, to adopt an attitude of
make-believe towards the narrative.[38]  Here, the essential
congruence between Currie and Walton is the relation they
both recognize between normativity and imagination in
fiction. 
Walton stated that depiction is characterized by features such
as resemblance and “the capacity of a representation to be
understood without decoding and inference,” and that
depictive representation is consequently conducive to rich and
vivid perceptual games of make-believe.[39]  He used ‘rich’ to
refer to the amount of detail conveyed, and ‘vivid’ to describe
the level of realism the experience involves, that is, the ease
with which one is able to make-believe the fiction.[40] 
Depiction stands in contrast to description. “In general, what
we call pictures make much better props in visual games than
verbal descriptions would.”[41]  My imaginings of Miller are
therefore particularly rich and vivid because the prop, that is,
 the image of Hanks, is a detailed and realistic depictive
representation.[42]   
Currie agrees that the perceptual nature of the imagination in
film produces rich and vivid imaginings.[43]  In the novel
Saving Private Ryan, the author could have chosen to describe
Miller’s hair as “short, brown.”[44]  Different readers would
imagine different shades of brown and different styles of
short.  In the film, I imagined Miller’s hair to be the exact
color and style I saw on Hanks’ head.  The same would be true
of a painting of Miller, and the experience of the visual arts is
characterized by giving rise to these perceptual imaginings. 
Currie and Walton both addressed this perceptual nature, but
neither attached significance to film as a paradigmatic form of
depictive representation.  I shall consider this omission after
returning to Lopes’ and Scruton’s respective arguments.
3.  The creative imagination
In order to defend Currie from Lopes, I must demonstrate that
his theory of cinematic imagination does not allow for
experience without imagination.  The defense is
straightforward, and I summarise Lopes’ objection as follows:  
P1        I can have a cinematic experience without belief.
P2        Imagination is imagined belief.
P3        Real beliefs and imagined beliefs are both beliefs.
C1        I can have a cinematic experience without 
            imagination.
I accept P1 because I can have an experience of Miller without
believing in his existence.  P2 is questionable because
imagination is not restricted to imagined belief.  For Currie,
imagining comprises two different elements: simulated beliefs
and simulated desires.[45]  I imagine Miller on Omaha Beach,
but if the narrative is to succeed I must also desire (imagined
desire because Miller is fictional) that he survive the battle.  So
there is an aspect of imagination that cannot be subsumed
under belief, because it is imagined desire.
P3 is even more precarious.  Real beliefs and imagined beliefs
are only two types of belief in a linguistic sense, and they
cannot be substituted for each other.  Currie described
imaginings as different from real beliefs and desires by being
removed from the usual perceptual inputs and behavioural
outputs.  Imaginary beliefs and beliefs are two entirely
different types of thing.  Consider a parallel argument:   
P1        I can ride a horse.
P2        Imaginary horses and real horses are both horses.
C1        Therefore I can ride an imaginary horse. 
I can imagine riding an imaginary horse but I cannot really
ride a creature that only exists in my mind.  The meaningful
dichotomy for Currie is between the imagined and the real, not
between beliefs and desires.  Imagined beliefs and imagined
desires share the common characteristics of being non-real
and being run off-line.  Real beliefs and real desires both
respond to perceptual input and both motivate behavior. 
Imagined belief cannot therefore be substituted for real belief
in Lopes’ conclusion, and his claim that Currie’s theory allows
for experience without imagination is false. 
Scruton’s proposal that film is a prop for fantasy seems even
less convincing.  First, it relies on his idiosyncratic definition of
fantasy as a phenomenon opposed to imagination, rather than
Currie’s idea of fantasy as a variant of imagination.[46] 
Although Stock supports much of Scruton’s argument, she also
maintains that fantasy involves the imagination, which, in the
light of Scruton’s subsequent insistence on the importance of
the contrast, seems to call her endorsement into
question.[47]  Second, Scruton’s position is dependent on his
view that film is not a representational art form, which is
based on his theory that the causal relation between an ideal
photograph and its subject means that photographs are
transparent.[48]  He maintains that the use of the camera is
analogous to the use of a mirror and that while a hypothetical
“art of mirrors” could exist, it would not be a representational
art form.[49] 
If Currie conceived of cinematic imagination as visualization,
one might be inclined to agree with Scruton, as there seems
little, if any, visualization required in watching a film.  I do not
need to visualize Miller:  I see an image of Hanks and the
image serves as a prop for me to imagine Miller looking
exactly like Hanks.  On a broader scale, the whole film serves
a prop for me to imagine the fictional narrative.  I make-
believe when I watch a play, complete with its conventions
and constraints, and I make-believe when I watch a film,
which, due to its closer likeness to reality, is usually easier to
understand.  While Scruton’s philosophy of film fails, he is
nonetheless correct in identifying a tension between the role of
imagination and the art form of film, as I shall show.
In one of his few discussions of film in Mimesis as Make-
Believe, Walton used the contrast with theater to prove that
make-believe is more vivid if it has an object.[50]  In the
theater the audience is actually in the presence of the actors,
and the actors are the objects of the audience’s imaginings, as
well as prompters and props.  In the cinema, the audience is in
the presence of images onscreen, and these images are
prompters and props, but not objects.  Hanks is the object of
imagination, because I imagine him as Miller; I do not make-
believe of the image of Hanks that it is Miller.  This seems
accurate, but I cannot accept Walton’s conclusion that the
presence of actors as objects of imagination makes a play
more vivid than a film.  ‘Vivid’ refers to the ease with which
one is able to make-believe, and the contrary seems
true.[51]      
Scruton notes that the depiction of events in a play, e.g.  the
murder of Desdemona in Othello, is “stylized and bound by
convention,” whereas cinematic depiction is lifelike.[52]  The
art form of theater is constrained in ways that film is not, like
the size of the stage.  In Richard III, therefore, Shakespeare
uses a duel between King Richard and the Earl of Richmond to
represent the historical Battle of Bosworth Field, which
involved over 20,000 combatants.  One needs to interpret the
representation and have some knowledge of theatrical
convention to understand the work.  In Saving Private Ryan,
the landing on Omaha Beach is represented in a completely
lifelike fashion and requires no interpretation.[53]  There may
have been only hundreds, rather than thousands, of actors,
but the special effects are such that it appears as if the viewer
is watching a representation that is almost identical to the
event.  I shall not labor the point, but I maintain that
photorealistic film (usually) involves a more realistic
representation than theater, and is therefore (usually) more
rather than less vivid.  The presence of the actors in the
theater undoubtedly adds an element that is missing in film,
but film is, paradoxically, perhaps, more lifelike. 
The reason film prompts more vivid imaginings than theater is
found in Walton’s account of the power of depictive
representation and Currie’s account of likeness.  A film is more
lifelike than the theater and painting and requires less
decoding.  One might say the same of a photograph as
opposed to a painting, but a film is more lifelike than a
photograph because of its transtemporal information – the
automorphic representation of duration – and the auditory
experience it affords.  My thesis is that film is the most lifelike
of all representational art forms, the paradigm of perceptual
realism, and that the tension between film and imagination is
between the normativity of film as a prop and the creative
imagination of the audience. 
The images of Hanks in Saving Private Ryan do indeed
produce detailed and realistic imaginings.  As the imaginings
become richer, however, they become correspondingly more
restricted.  In the novel, the words “short, brown” serve as a
prop that authorizes me to imagine Miller’s hair in a number of
shades and lengths.  So long as I do not stray from the
meaning of the two adjectives, I will be adhering to the rules
of the particular game of make-believe for which the text is a
prop.  But when I see an image of Hanks, I must imagine
Miller’s appearance as exactly the same.  If I imagine that
Miller has slightly longer or lighter hair, or a different shaped
face or different colored eyes, then I am not responding to the
prop appropriately.  Where the novel makes it fictionally true
that Miller has short, brown hair, the film makes it fictionally
true that Miller’s hair is exactly like Hanks’ hair. 
If one considers the film as a whole, one can see similarly how
the very richness and vivacity of the imaginings restrict my
response by specifying what is appropriate in explicit detail. 
Richard III presents me with two actors pretending to duel and
leaves me free to imagine the battle that rages around them
in a variety of ways.  Saving Private Ryan presents me with
images of the actors apparently engaged in a real battle and
requires me to imagine that they are the characters in the
fictional narrative.  My experience of Omaha Beach is more
realistic and detailed than Bosworth Field, but there is far less
creativity required on my part.  The latter requires extensive
use of my cognitive processes, while the former is relatively
effortless and even passive.[54] 
I realize that this is a superficially controversial claim.  I have
already explained how, even in my chosen example selected
as a paradigm of vivid cinema, I had to employ my
imagination to understand the film.  Offscreen events need not
be supplementary to the main narrative, and there are many
films where the viewer is invited to imagine crucial scenes,
such as the murder of Marion Crane in the shower in Alfred
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960).  The very same device, however, is
frequently used in literature.  A particularly dramatic example
occurs in Arturo Pérez-Reverte’s The Sun Over Breda (1998),
where half of the fourth chapter is devoted to setting the
scene for a duel between Captain Alatriste and another
soldier.  The narrator comments on Alatriste’s smile as the
men prepare to fight, and the next sentence is: “As they pulled
the Valencian onto land, blood stained the calm waters of the
canal around him.”[55]  There are also films, like Alain
Resnais’ Last Year at Marienbad (1961), where the complexity
of the narrative structure demands an active imaginative
engagement from the audience.  Once again, however, a
similar complexity is employed in novels such as James Joyce’s
Ulysses (1922) and William Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying (1930). 
My claim is simply that the viewing of a photorealistic film
usually requires less effort on the part of the audience than
watching a play or reading a novel.  This characteristic is a
symptom of the problem of cinematic imagination; I shall
show how it also provides a solution. 
Currie and Walton describe imagination as a variable term,
and cognitive theorists in general admit of different varieties of
propositional imagination.[56]  I have mentioned two
variations in Currie thus far:
            I1: mental image-making.
            I2: adopting an attitude of make-believe towards 
                  fictional propositions.
Leslie Stevenson identifies 12 different conceptions of
imagination (18 if one includes his sub-categories).[57]  The
two conceptions which parallel Currie’s usage are:
[I3:] The ability to entertain mental images. 
[I4:] The ability to think of things one conceives of 
        as fictional, as opposed to what one believes 
        to be real or conceives of as possibly real.[58]
Stevenson specifies that I4 is compatible with Walton’s
account of fiction as a game of make-believe generated by
props.  He then identifies two sub-categories of I4:
            [I5:] The ability to create (or “think up”) fictions.
            [I6:] The ability to think of already-created fictions as
                    fictional.[59]
The concept of creativity is itself variable, and perhaps opaque
as well, and I5 refers to the creation of fictions by poets,
dramatists, and novelists.[60]  Stevenson’s classification
reflects the standard concern with the concept in aesthetics,
the discussion of the creative genius of the artist exemplified
in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement.[61]  My concern,
however, is with the creativity required on the part of the
appreciator of the work rather than the creator.  Ignacio Götz
identified five different conceptions of creativity, but defined
the term as “a process of making.”[62]  The delineation
captures the basic meaning of creativity I wish to convey, a
meaning that is confined to neither the artist nor art.  I am
reluctant to add to Stevenson’s list of conceptions of
imagination and prefer to consider I5 in terms of Götz’s
definition of creativity.  In fact, the move is unnecessary, as I5
is well-suited to my purpose:  if the connotation (the creativity
of the artist) is dropped, one is left with the denotation, which
is simply the ability (of anyone) to create fictions. 
Creativity is a requirement of the appreciator of a work of art
as well as the creator, albeit to a much lesser extent.  When I
watch Richard III, the work of art serves as a prop for my
imagination, and in making believe that the battle rages
around the two actors, I engage in a creative process of
making, or thinking up Bosworth Field.  I5 is thus the aspect
of imagination that creates what is not perceived by the
viewer, that is, the creative imagination.  I propose that a film
is very poor prop for I5.  A play, with its conventions and
restrictions, is better; and a novel, where my perception of a
few words might inspire the creation of a complete character
or setting, is better still.  In contrast, film is a very effective
prop for I6.  When I watch the already-created fiction called
Saving Private Ryan, the work serves as a prop for my
imagination, and my imaginings are particularly rich and vivid
because of the paradigmatic nature of the depictive
representation.  Scruton is therefore right in claiming that film
leaves little to the imagination (I5), but Currie is also correct,
because film produces detailed and realistic imaginings (I6).
This distinction between the creative and, for want of a better
term, fictional imagination provides the solution to the
problem.  Film is the most realistic of the representational arts,
and this likeness to reality results in a unique relationship
between film and imagination.  Film serves as a prop for rich
and vivid imaginings, but the richness and vivacity leave little
room for creativity on the part of the imaginer.  I maintain
that it is impossible to reconcile the fictional and creative
conceptions of imagination, and the question of the scope for
imagination in film depends entirely on which is being
employed.  The solution to the problem of cinematic
imagination is the recognition of the two different conceptions,
which itself involves an understanding of the normativity of
props.  The reduced role for the creative imagination in film
appreciation may have consequences for the status of the art
form, but that is a question which must be answered
elsewhere.[63]
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